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Abstract Growing research and public awareness of the
environmental impacts of tobacco present an opportunity
for environmental science and public health to work
together. Various United Nations agencies share interests
in mitigating the environmental costs of tobacco. Since
2000, transnational tobacco industry consolidation has
accelerated, spotlighting the specific companies
responsible for the environmental and human harms
along the tobacco production chain. Simultaneously,
corporate social responsibility norms have led the
industry to disclose statistics on the environmental harms
their business causes. Yet, independent and consistent
reporting remain hurdles to accurately assessing tobacco’s
environmental impact. This article is the first to analyze
publicly available industry data on tobacco manufacturing
pollution. Tobacco’s significant environmental impact
suggests this industry should be included in
environmental analyses as a driver of environmental
degradation influencing climate change. Countries aiming
to meet UN Sustainable Development Goals must act to
reduce environmental harms caused by the tobacco
industry.
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INTRODUCTION
The World Health Organization’s (WHO) 2017 report
“Tobacco and Its Environmental Impact: An Overview”
calls attention to the environmental burden of growing,
curing, packaging, transporting, manufacturing, and dis-
tributing 6.25 trillion cigarette sticks annually (Hendlin
2017; Kelly 2017; World Health Organization 2017a). So
far, the global tobacco control agenda has mainly focused
on the one billion smokers and seven million people per
year dying globally from tobacco use and exposure (Ng
et al. 2014; Novotny et al. 2015; Reitsma et al. 2017;
World Health Organization 2017b). Yet, important
research examining deforestation (Otan˜ez et al. 2009;
Otan˜ez and Glantz 2011; Eriksen et al. 2015) and cigarette
butt waste (Novotny et al. 2009; Healton et al. 2011;
Slaughter et al. 2011; Curtis et al. 2014) has made the
public health case for confronting tobacco’s environmental
impact—creating allies between public health and envi-
ronmental interests (Freiberg 2014; Curtis et al. 2016;
Wallbank et al. 2017).
Tobacco smoke emissions from cigarettes alone on a
global scale contribute significant masses of toxicants to
the global environment. In a single year, direct emissions
from smoking contribute tens of thousands of metric tons
of known human carcinogens, toxicants, and greenhouse
gases (Repace 2004). Toxic emissions from all smoked
cigarettes annually include an estimated 3000–6000 metric
tons of formaldehyde and 12 000–47 000 tons of nicotine
(Novotny et al. 2015). In addition, three major greenhouse
gases are released in significant amounts via tobacco
smoke: carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxides (Gil-
mour et al. 2006; World Health Organization 2017a). One
study found that the environmental pollution from smoking
three cigarettes caused up to ten times the small particulate
matter (PM2.5) concentrations of idling a diesel car engine
for 30 minutes (Invernizzi et al. 2004).
Hand in hand with tobacco’s ecological harms, the
environmental justice consequences of tobacco are press-
ing. The human harms from deforestation (Lecours et al.
2012; Leppan et al. 2014; Jew et al. 2017; Jimu et al.
2017), farm workers suffering from green leaf sickness
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(Schep et al. 2009; Benson 2011; Faria et al. 2014; Bon-
amonte et al. 2016), soil exhaustion (Leppan et al. 2014),
and other fallout from tobacco farming, mostly occurring in
low- and middle-income countries, has become legible to
environmental organizations, governments, and intergov-
ernmental institutions. The sizable environmental impact
of cigarette butt litter—the most pervasive litter item found
on beach clean ups (Novotny et al. 2009; Novotny and
Slaughter 2014)—also pollutes terrestrial and aquatic
ecosystems (Healton et al. 2011; Slaughter et al. 2011).
Industrial ecology research on product lifecycle analy-
sis, however, has yet to adequately address the tobacco
industry’s considerable contribution to environmental pol-
lution and degradation (Trucost 2009).
The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) which aim to address global challenges to both
sustainability and development (United Nations 2015a),
incorporate as target 3a the WHO Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (FCTC) (World Health Organization
2003; United Nations 2015a, b), the landmark international
treaty and global governance structure ratified by 181
countries to reduce the damage of the tobacco epidemic.
This reinforces the need to focus on tobacco as a global
industry considerably contributing to environmental
degradation and health inequalities (Kulik et al. 2017).
Increasingly, the reinforcing effects of environmental sus-
tainability and public health dovetail in their fight to reduce
the consequences of tobacco.
This article is the first to review the environmental costs
of tobacco manufacturing with the industry’s own pub-
lished data. While estimations exist (Zafeiridou et al.
2018), quantifying the environmental damage of the
tobacco industry has not yet been fully measured, under-
stood, or acted upon. This is due in part to a lack of
accurate, reliable, independent environmental reporting
and data transparency. Until the early 2000’s, few data
were publicly available. Since the early 2000’s, some data
has been made voluntarily available through pressure on
the industry to abide by prevailing corporate social
responsibility (CSR) standards, although these reports are
neither systematic nor standardized. Nonetheless, analyz-
ing the tobacco industry’s own data reporting the envi-
ronmental costs of tobacco manufacturing clarifies the
contribution of tobacco to environmental pollution, even if
this self-reported data emerges from flawed methods and
an overly narrow scope.
METHODS
Our analysis proceeds from the self-reported industry data
published in public documents. From January through May
2018 we examined tobacco industry sustainability reports
and annual investor reports from 2005 to 2018, as well as
UN Global Compact reports (before tobacco companies
were excluded from this organization in September 2017),
Carbon Disclosure Project reports, and other publicly
available resources to gather industry-reported data on the
environmental costs of tobacco manufacturing. Although
we reviewed data since 2005, whenever possible, we used
the most updated environmental reporting information
available through July 2018. We also drew upon previous
estimates of the environmental costs of tobacco in the peer-
review literature and third-party reports.
The largest tobacco companies currently report their
annual energy use, CO2-equivalent emissions, water use,
water discharge, hazardous waste, and total waste,
including or omitting different areas of reporting over time.
For example, Altria does not report water discharge data,
Japan Tobacco International (JTI) stopped after 2014
reporting intensity (number of cigarettes produced or mil-
lions of dollars of revenue per unit of pollution), and the
granularity of reporting detail differs dramatically by cor-
poration. To the extent possible, current data on these
metrics is included here for six major tobacco companies:
Altria/Philip Morris, Philip Morris International (PMI),
Reynolds American Inc. (RAI, now a subsidiary of BAT),
British American Tobacco (BAT), Imperial Brands (for-
merly Imperial Tobacco), and Japan Tobacco International
(JTI). China National Tobacco Company (CNTC) is
addressed separately, as the company, which produces
more than 40% of the world’s cigarettes, appears to follow
different voluntary reporting systems. Available manufac-
turing data pertain mainly to cigarettes, rather than to
smokeless tobacco or electronic-cigarettes (e-cigarettes).
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
AND BACKGROUND
While the questions surrounding the tobacco industry’s
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting and audit-
ing are unique due to the scrutiny this particular industry
receives, the problems of industry externalities and the lack
of transparent third-party auditing are more general prob-
lems with the CSR paradigm shared by other companies
(Tesler and Malone 2008; Hirshbein 2012; Fooks et al.
2013; McDaniel et al. 2016, 2018). Fernando and Lawr-
ence (2014) propose an integrated theoretical framework
for explaining CSR practices by bringing together three
inter-related and complementary theories: legitimacy the-
ory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory. This inte-
grated approach supports the existing research on the
motivation and impact of the tobacco industry’s own CSR
efforts. While tobacco CSR programs and the marketing of
these programs is constrained more than some industries
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(Dorfman et al. 2012; McDaniel and Malone 2012), insofar
as in many developed countries they cannot use their CSR
donations to explicitly promote their product to youth,
nonetheless like other industries the tobacco industry seeks
to profit from their CSR efforts and “neutralize” negative
publicity (Gonzalez et al. 2012; Fooks et al. 2013). Our
results are discussed through understanding that the
tobacco industry’s efforts to reduce their environmental
harms amount to CSR initiatives displaying a lack of
transparency and independent verification, that limit
objective assessment of the environmental impact of
tobacco manufacturing.
Accounting for the environmental impact of tobacco
manufacturing requires foremost having access to reliable
data. Two problems arise: one procedural, the other epis-
temological. While environmental accounting in the last
decades has become less haphazard and more scientific, it
remains an inexact art. Open questions include: do con-
sulting and auditing firms have full access to industry data,
and is the industry reporting everything? Are companies
aware of all externalities, or may there be other costs not
yet reckoned due to conceptual blinders? Are these data
being fully reported? From the tobacco industry’s publicly
available materials, there are clear gaps and discrepancies
from year to year. If the data exist, why are they not
reported? If they do not exist, why not?
The lack of independent third-party oversight of these
reports, i.e., oversight from agencies not directly paid and
thus incentivized by tobacco company interests to favor-
ably report, also is common among many industries, not
just tobacco (Fooks et al. 2013). CSR “disclosure interac-
tion effects” may take place if there is incentive on the part
of management to deliver CSR goals, undermining the
reliability of assurance agency reports for both investors
and the public (Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2015). This
problem exists across many industries. Although the Glo-
bal Reporting Initiative aims to develop standards for CSR
auditing, because CSR assurance companies operate in a
“competitive, mainly unregulated market,” the credibility
of directly industry-paid CSR assurances can lack, or be
perceived to lack, credibility (Cohen and Simnett 2015).
Because tobacco’s particular harm to human and envi-
ronmental health, and the non-essential status of the pro-
duct, mandating data transparency for tobacco
manufacturing warrants prioritization. Policies to provide a
mechanism for outside accounting could consider tobacco
product taxes to account for environmental impact, and
then allow independent auditing of the tobacco industry
using state funds, creating a financial firewall between
industry and CSR assurance agencies. Currently, however,
such an arrangement is absent. Piecemeal rather than
organized reporting, and in-house rather than government
or agency oversight on environmental pollution, greatly
restrict current scientific assessments of the environmental
impacts of tobacco product manufacture (Hirschhorn 2004;
Moerman and Van Der Laan 2005; Palazzo and Richter
2005; Fooks et al. 2011). Stipulating a standardized metric,
assessed by disinterested third-party reporting agencies
would be a first step to accurately determine the true costs
of tobacco production.
Research on what motivates industries to respond to
their environmental and social impact exists for many
industries, not just tobacco. Companies tend to act based on
a mixture of novel policy constraints, updated risk assess-
ments, cost offsets, and the business opportunities that arise
in tackling externalities (Agrawala et al. 2011; Glaas et al.
2017). Brand image is also crucial to a CSR calculus
(McDaniel and Malone 2009; Hastings 2012). Some
companies have been shown to spend more money on
advertising their CSR than they actually spent on sustain-
ability or social responsibility projects (Gonzalez et al.
2012; Hastings 2012; McDaniel et al. 2018). Minimizing
environmental harms through comparison with other
industries is also a common tactic. For example, in PMI’s
2016 “Communication on Progress” for the UN Global
Compact, PMI minimizes the water costs of tobacco,
arguing that “[t]obacco growing and manufacturing take
around one-third of the water required to make the same
amount of tea or one-sixth that of coffee or chocolate (per
weight of finished product)” (Philip Morris International
2016). PMI’s comparison attempts to put tobacco on par
with these other products, ignoring the differentiator that
these other products do not kill one in two of their daily
users, as tobacco does (World Health Organization 2017b).
Tobacco companies appear to place the environmental
externalities and global environmental impact of their
business lowest in their list of priorities (Fig. 1), over-
looking that the environmental costs of tobacco manufac-
turing and distribution extends beyond these companies.
This may be due to fiduciary responsibilities, or a lack of
research and awareness of tobacco’s environmental harms.
The latter reason is supported by the fact that the Frame-
work Convention Alliance (FCA), an umbrella group of
tobacco control NGOs supporting the FCTC, in a literature
review on each of the FCTC’s 38 articles, could not
identify any literature on tobacco and the sustainable
management of water and energy for their 2015 data report
(Framework Convention Alliance and Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids 2015). The FCA’s inability to locate
relevant studies on the sustainability of the tobacco man-
ufacturing reveals the need for systematic and indepen-
dently verified data.
Industry estimations regarding what constitutes an
environmental issue versus appraisals by regulatory bodies
also diverge. In a reporting questionnaire from the Carbon
Disclosure Project (CDP) asking “Was your organization
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subject to any penalties, fines and/or enforcement orders
for breaches of abstraction licenses, discharge consents or
other water and wastewater-related regulations in the
reporting year?” PMI answered, “Yes, not significant,”
while reporting that 10% of their facilities were cited and
fined for wastewater violations. One of the violations was
for sub-par wastewater quality, including “increased levels
of detergents, phosphates, [and] ammonium nitrogen above
relatively tight limits for these substances in the Ukraine”
(Philip Morris International 2017a). PMI’s deemphasizing
evaluation of the severity of their own violations, indica-
tive of the industry as a whole, highlights a discrepancy
between what qualifies as significant environmental health
trespasses for the industry versus the determined limits of
existing environmental health standards. There could be
other environmental health violations that are not reported
either because they are not regarded by the industry as
violations or because such reporting is not required.
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Article
12.4 specifically refers to the 2020 goal of achieving “the
environmentally sound management of chemicals and all
wastes throughout their life cycle,” while Article 3a
explicitly calls to “[s]trengthen the implementation of the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all
countries, as appropriate” (United Nations 2015b). This
heralds recognition of the crosscutting problem of tobacco
on both human health and the environment.
The United Nations Environmental Program’s The
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) pro-
gram’s report, Natural Capital at Risk—The Top 100
Externalities of Business found that if the major industries,
including tobacco manufacturing, accounted for their
unaccounted environmental impacts—38% which are
greenhouse gas emissions, 25% water use, 24% land use,
and 7% air pollution—they would not be profitable (Tru-
cost and TEEB for Business Coalition 2013).
One problem with sustainability goals—both public and
private—is the perennial problem of the shifting baseline
(i.e., Pauly 1995). Percent reductions of emissions are
always measured against a set date when emissions were
estimated. If the baseline is the highpoint for polluting and
inefficiency, then any improvement will appear a major
gain. If, however, a previous or future baseline is taken, the
same change over a different period might be cast in a less
Fig. 1 JTI’s graph of prioritization (Japan Tobacco Incorporated 2015)
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favorable light. Similarly, if the baseline is pegged at the
height of cigarette production, and then fewer cigarettes are
subsequently produced and sold, absolute numbers of water
use and CO2 emission will appear to go down, but their
actual efficiency (or intensity) may remain unchanged.
Another problem with voluntary environmental targets
is that if a company fails to make the target, it is easy to
simply stop reporting on the target or stop referring to the
goal. One example is in BAT’s 2016 Sustainability Report.
BAT held a “long-term standard” for “BAT-owned leaf
suppliers to use no more than an average of 1.5 kg of active
chemicals per hectare of tobacco per year” (British
American Tobacco 2017). When in 2016 the average use of
active chemicals per hectare of tobacco exceeded 2.16 kgs,
BAT decided to “no longer have a global average target”
and instead “will continue to work with our leaf suppliers
to better understand how improvements in best practice can
be applied in this area” (British American Tobacco 2017).
The move from measurable, quantifiable environmental
goals to less measurable data when targets are not met is
indicative of the problems with voluntary, non-mandatory
environmental initiatives.
A further problem generated by environmental goals in
response to CSR positioning is the tendency to initiate
more environmentally friendly practices in countries with
environmentally demanding publics, while continuing
lower environmental standards in facilities off the radar of
environmental advocates. PMI’s flagship green factories
are in developed countries rather than facilities in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs). They prominently dis-
play in their Sustainability Report that their “German
factories are powered by electricity generated by 100%
renewable sources” and that their “Canadian facilities in
Quebec and Brampton reduced their energy consumption
by over 10% through initiatives including [a] new building
management system, upgraded boilers and energy efficient
chillers” (PMI 2018). Imperial Tobacco likewise empha-
sized the energy efficiency improvements to their German
factories, while remaining silent on plants in LMICs (Im-
perial Brands PLC 2017). These efforts to address point-
source complaints often do not result in thoroughgoing
environmental reforms and improvements at all facilities in
countries where TCs command more economic leverage.
The environmental costs of tobacco manufacturing present
unaddressed environmental justice dimensions.
FINDINGS
The tobacco industry identifies manufacturing as the most
environment-destroying step of tobacco production. Forty-
three cents out of every dollar of industry costs goes
towards the manufacturing process, in contrast to only four
cents spent on purchasing tobacco leaf itself (Eriksen et al.
2015). A CSR report from Imperial Brands states, “Our
greatest direct impact on the environment comes from our
product manufacturing activities” (Imperial Tobacco
2006). As the ecological footprint from farming tobacco
has been more completely assessed than manufacturing and
has proven significant (Lecours et al. 2012), Imperial’s
statement—and the likelihood that their disclosure reflects
proportional ecological footprints of other tobacco com-
panies—emphasizes the need to learn more about the
environmental impact of tobacco manufacturing.
Environmental impact components
Common environmental impacts on which tobacco com-
panies (TCs) report include annual CO2-equivalent emis-
sions, energy use and mix, water use, waste water effluent,
tonnage of solid waste to landfill, percentage of waste
recycled, and tonnage of hazardous waste. This is standard
for most manufactures of products. The categories of
reporting, however, were incomplete in the early 2000s,
mostly focusing on complying with ISO 14001 and 14064
requirements related to environmental management in
compliance with quantifying and reporting greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions and reductions (Delmas and Montes-
Sancho 2011; Perego and Kolk 2012; British American
Tobacco 2015). Self-reporting in the past decade has grown
to include elaborate environmental audits by third-party
certification consultants, including ascertaining some of
suppliers’ environmental externalities along the commod-
ity chain. Baselines established a decade ago by the
industry itself become references for the industry to set
benchmarks for more efficient processes, measured by
decreasing inputs and externalities (e.g., CO2-equivalent
emissions) to achieve a higher manufacturing intensity (or
efficiency) per million cigarettes produced or per million
dollars of revenue.
Reducing environmental harms from tobacco manufac-
ture requires assessing all the primary points of pollution.
Stanford University’s Citadels industry manufacturing
facilities map (https://web.stanford.edu/group/tobaccoprv/
cgi-bin/map/) provides insight into the scope of pollution
caused by the 560 tobacco processing and manufacturing
facilities worldwide. Various elements to tobacco manu-
facturing create waste and emissions, including preparation
and treatment of the tobacco leaf, chemical additives, paper
wrapping, filters, and other components, each demanding
energy, water, waste, and materials. While there are many
points of intervention in the tobacco product supply chain
(Fig. 2), the leaf threshing and processing factories, stor-
age, and warehouses—the components of tobacco manu-
facturing—are the aspects of the commodity chain best
captured by current reported data.
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CO2-equivalent emissions
For CO2-equivalent (CO2e) emissions, the majority of
release happens in the agricultural production of tobacco
leaf, followed by the supply of non-tobacco materials and
distribution and logistics (BAT 2015). Nonetheless, man-
ufacturing pollution, distribution, and logistics (transport)
pollution still comprise approximately a third of tobacco’s
environmental impact due to CO2e pollution (Table 1).
To determine total CO2e emissions and other environ-
mental harms, generally climate change policymakers
distinguish between three different “scopes” of emissions
and resource usage. Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions
from sources directly controlled by a company or organi-
zation. Scope 2 emissions encompass emissions from
energy use dependent on source type. Scope 3 includes
indirect emissions, or CO2e embedded in purchased goods
and services, transportation and distribution, capital goods,
and activities not directly under the company’s control but
which they can influence (Fig. 3).
For 2017 scope 1 emissions globally, for example, PMI
emitted 229 116 tons CO2e from manufacturing, 118 487
tons due to its vehicle fleet, 3947 from aircraft, and 440
tons from its office activity. For scope 2 emissions, PMI
emitted 434 460 tons CO2e from manufacturing, and
15 800 from offices. Included in these scope 2 emissions,
PMI burned 250 645 megawatt hours (MWh) of diesel,
260 866 MWh of gasoline, and 41 348 MWh of brown
coal, for a total of 923 345 MWh. Scope 3 CO2e emissions
for PMI, however, reached 3 611 000 tons, their majority.
These emissions include the carbon costs of burning wood
and coal to cure tobacco as well as the materials for the
cigarette such as packaging, cigarette papers, and acetate
tow for filters (PMI 2017b) (Table 1). While PMI and other
companies described instituting measures to reduce the
most polluting types of energy use, such as replacing wood
for curing with gas facilities, these interventions did not
significantly decrease their emissions year-on-year.
Emissions by the global tobacco industry are roughly on
par with those of other major industries. For comparison,
the coffee house chain Starbucks, with 16 000 stores in 61
countries serving 50 million customers per week, emits 1
340 000 tons of CO2e per year (scope 1 & 2 in 2015) (Star-
bucks Coffee Company 2018) to PMI’s reported 1 150 000
Fig. 2 JTI supply chain diagram (JT Group 2017)
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tons for scope 1 and 2 (PMI 2017b). By extrapolation,
assuming that other tobacco manufactures have similar
greenhouse gas effluent, since PMI has 14.6% of the global
tobacco market (Felsted 2016), the global total for tobacco
CO2e emissions (scopes 1–3) is estimated to be 31 million
tons of CO2e—about half Chevron’s 66 million tons CO2e
2016 emissions (Chevron Corporation 2017). By another
calculation, the entire product lifecycle of a single cigarette
contributes 5.72 grams of CO2e (Qian et al. 2016), leading
to 39.4 million tons of CO2e for the 6.25 trillion cigarettes
produced worldwide. That the tobacco industry’s CO2e
emissions are in the same general category with a major oil
company, without providing any social benefit, raises the
social question of whether such continued emissions are
worth their costs in exacerbating climate change.
Energy use
As with CO2e emissions, with energy, companies make
green claims as well, that they are decreasing scope 1 and 2
emissions. For example, in their 2014 CSR Report, Altria
states that it “converted coal-fired boilers to natural gas
boilers at three manufacturing facilities, significantly
decreasing Scope 1 greenhouse gas emissions” (Altria
2015). BAT derived nearly all of its energy from non-
renewable sources (British American Tobacco 2018).
PMI’s reported energy use is anomalously low, less than
half of that of BAT, even though PMI produces more
cigarettes worldwide. For this reason, BAT’s energy use
has been used here to extrapolate total global total energy
usage, as BAT is between JTI and PMI both in terms of
cigarettes produced and total energy use (Table 2).
All major tobacco companies consume various forms of
fossil fuels. In terms of the mix of energy consumed in
2016, just counting nonrenewable resources, Altria, for
instance, consumed 22.6 million hundred cubic feet (hcf)
of natural gas, 36 176 gallons of fuel oil, 870 293 gallons of
propane, 151 743 gallons of diesel, 2 789 801 gallons of
gasoline, and 429 381 gallons of jet fuel (Altria 2017). But
what is not included in Altria’s report is that a Trucost
report found that “Tobacco company Altria Group Inc, the
parent company of Philip Morris USA, has the highest
carbon intensity in the [entire] Personal and Household
Goods sector,” placing Altria in the same carbon intensity
group as oil and coal companies, the highest quintile
(Trucost 2009). While Trucost focused on Altria in their
report, the company is not especially anomalous among
major tobacco companies for their high use of carbon-in-
tensive fuels.
Intensity
Manufacturing intensity refers to how much per unit of
product is required for a given metric, such as energy, CO2
emissions, water use, or waste production (Japan Tobacco
Incorporated 2017). For example, compared to their 2009
baseline, in 2013 JTI required per cigarette roughly 10%
more energy, 5% more CO2e emissions, but 10% less
water. Their report did not contain the raw data, however.
Reporting in per million cigarettes only, instead of also
including absolute numbers, obscures rising overall
Table 1 Reported CO2e emissions from tobacco manufacturing
Company; year reported; scope, if reported) Thousands of tons CO2e Tons per million cigarettes/dollars/pounds in
revenue
Altria (2016) (Altria 2017) 392 (total) Not reported
170 (scope 1)
210 (scope 2)
11 (scope 3)
BAT (2016) (British American Tobacco 2016) 862 (total) 0.81 per million cigs
687 (scope 1-2)
Imperial (2016) (Imperial Brands PLC 2017) 329 (total: differs from categories below) 41.7 per £million
26.7 (scope 1)
1.4 (scope 2)
187.6 (scope 3)
JTI (2016) (Japan Tobacco Incorporated 2017) 6513 (total) 0.65 per million cigs
714 (scope 1 and 2)
PMI (2015/16) 5690 (total) (2016) (PMI 2017b) 0.66 per million cigs (2015) (PMI 2018)
RAI 2015 (RAI 2017) 244 (total) 22.84 per US $million
Global total 30 958 904
Bold numbers are total emissions (scopes 1 to 3 inclusive)
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environmental costs, as the company produces more
cigarettes each year. Even if manufacturing becomes more
efficient for some measures, if more total cigarettes are
produced, environmental harm is nonetheless increased.
While during the 2000s and early 2010s the standard unit
of measurement for intensity was “x amount of [water,
CO2, energy, etc.] per million cigarettes produced,” a
recent trend has been to not mention the amount of envi-
ronmental impact per cigarettes produced by instead
measuring intensity in environmental costs per million of
US dollars or British pounds of net tobacco revenue (Im-
perial Tobacco Group PLC 2015).
Water consumption and discharge
Tobacco manufacturing is extremely water-use intensive
for plant commodities (Table 3). While TCs claim incre-
mental gains in water conservation over previous years,
their impact on freshwater remains substantial. In the
available data, Altria’s water consumption reporting is
anomalously high. Imperial acknowledges that 92% of all
water use occurs in tobacco growing, with another 7% used
in paper and cardboard manufacturing, with only 1% of
their water use due to end-product manufacturing (Imperial
Tobacco Group 2014). Using contracted but non-company
suppliers for their tobacco leaf and other raw materials,
TCs can omit these environmental impacts from their
public sustainability reporting, even if they privately hold
full life cycle analysis data.
Companies report less transparently on the amount of
water they discharge, the refuse water released into the
environment resulting from the manufacturing process
(Table 4). Some companies, such as BAT which claims to
recycle and reuse 11% of its wastewater (British American
Tobacco 2018), aim to recapture their wastewater to reduce
freshwater usage and the contamination problems waste
water presents.
Fig. 3 PMI Targets. From the PMI 2016 “Communication on Progress” for the UN Global Compact Report (Philip Morris International 2017b).
Note the large gap between 2020 targets on reducing CO2e from the 2010 baseline and 2016 progress
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Waste disposal: Landﬁll, recycled, hazardous waste
Waste disposal: Landﬁll
For manufacturing, the sources of waste are both tobacco
and constituents (Table 5). JTI, for example, purchases
annually over 300 000 tons of non-tobacco materials for
processing, much of which ends up in landfills after use
(Japan Tobacco Incorporated 2013). JTI also reported in
2016 that 77% of waste is recycled, and 8% recovered,
with 15% ending up in the landfill (Japan Tobacco Incor-
porated 2017).
Waste disposal: Recycled
While all companies report on their total waste, fewer
document the percent of waste they recycle from the
manufacturing process. For some companies, it is unclear
what type of handling of materials is included under the
heading “recycled,” and how much environmental effect
Table 2 Reported yearly energy use for some of the largest tobacco companies
Company Gigawatt hours/year Kilowatt hours per million cigarettes/$/£ revenue
Altria (2016) (Altria 2017) 1316 (Altria 2017) Not reported
BAT (2016) (British American Tobacco 2018) 2360 (276 renewable) 2911 per million cigs
Imperial (2016) (Imperial Brands 2017) 880 137 664 per £million
JTI (Japan Tobacco Incorporated 2017) 2632 (2016) (665 renewable) Not reported
PMI 923 (2017) (PMI 2017b) 107 500 per US$ million (2012) (Philip
Morris International 2017b)
RAI (2015) (Reynolds American International 2015) 904 84 639 per US$ million
Global total 16 164
Table 3 Reported water consumption used during tobacco products manufacturing
Company Thousands of cubic meters Cubic meters per million cigs
produced/£/$ million revenue
Altria (2016) (Altria 2017) 9422 Not reported
BAT (2017) (British American Tobacco 2018) 3667 3.43 per million cigs
Imperial (2016) (Imperial Brands 2017) 1648 230 per £million
JTI (2016) (Japan Tobacco Incorporated 2017) 9896 Not reported
PMI (2016) (Philip Morris International 2016) 3394 3.95 per million cigs
RAI 2015 (Reynolds American International 2015) 1898 177.75 per US$ million
Global total 23 247
Table 4 Reported water discharge during tobacco product manufacturing
Company Thousands of cubic meters Per million cigs (cubic meters)
Altria Not reported Not reported
BAT (British American Tobacco 2018) 2156
Total as sewage: 2108
2.01 per million cigs
Imperial Not reported Not reported
JTI (JT Group 2018) 5527 Not reported
PMI (2016) (PMI 2017b) 1901 Not reported
RAI (2015) (Reynolds American International 2018) 1898 130 per US$ million
Global total 13 021
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these efforts have, without a more detailed and transparent
reporting concerning what recycling waste entails. For
companies reporting waste recycling percentage, Altria
reported 74.3 million pounds of recycled waste (Altria
2015); JTI recycled 78% of its waste (JT Group 2018); and
RAI reported 69% of its solid waste is recycled (RAI
2017).
Waste disposal: Hazardous waste
According to the Toxic Release Inventory Database, over a
million pounds of toxic chemicals were released in 2008
from tobacco manufacturing plants, including ammonia,
nicotine, hydrochloric acid, methanol, and nitrates (The
Right to Know Network 2008). In terms of specific
reporting, in 2011 BAT reported that 1973 metric tons of
hazardous waste were produced from the tobacco manu-
facturing process (British American Tobacco 2011); Altria
discharged 999 lb of phosphorus in wastewater, and 17
000 lb of nitrogen, according to their 2014 CSR Report
(Altria 2015); and Imperial produced 330 tons of hazardous
waste in 2016 (Imperial Brands PLC 2017).
Environmental manufacturing goals
Another aspect of TCs’ CSR programs is to establish
‘Environmental Goals’ for their manufacturing processes
(e.g., PMI 2018). These include measurable reductions in
energy use, increases in the proportion of facility waste that
is recycled or reused, and reduced CO2e emissions and
water consumption, among other common stated goals. For
example, BAT’s 2014 sustainability report claimed a 45%
reduction in CO2e emissions against 2000 emissions (Bri-
tish American Tobacco 2015), and other companies high-
light what they are doing to mitigate greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions from their production facilities. Altria’s
2014 Environmental Manufacturing Goals for 2016 inclu-
ded reducing energy use by 10%, reducing GHG emissions
by 20%, achieving 50% water neutrality (recycling water
and investing in clean water elsewhere), recycling or
reusing 95% of facility waste, and reducing packaging
materials by 5 million pounds (Altria 2015). BAT
emphasized its green credentials based on its inclusion in
the Dow Jones Sustainability World and Europe Indexes in
2011 (British American Tobacco 2011). They claimed, “To
reduce our carbon footprint, we address our energy use, our
waste to landfill and our business travel. We are also
beginning to explore opportunities for generating and
purchasing renewable energy” (British American Tobacco
2011). At the same time, BAT reported that in addition to
the 909 496 metric tons of tobacco leaf they used in their
products, they also used 442 893 metric tons of other
materials including cigarette paper, wrapping, packaging,
filters, glues, and inks, plus 41 951 metric tons of indirect
materials such as cleaning agents (British American
Tobacco 2011). Industry-initiated environmental goals
appear to be based on revenue-capturing low hanging fruit
rather than actually substantially addressing the most sev-
ere environmental costs of business.
China National Tobacco Company
Extrapolating from the industrial ecology self-reporting
from the largest tobacco companies, a total environmental
impact can be ascertained, even in the absence of publicly
available data from the Chinese National Tobacco Com-
pany (CNTC). The CNTC has nominally expanded into
markets outside China (1% of total sales); nonetheless it
produces roughly 44% of the cigarettes consumed globally
(2.5 trillion out of 6.25 trillion) (Euromonitor International
2016), with China consuming roughly ten times as many
cigarettes as any other nation (Campaign for Tobacco-Free
Kids 2017). Thus, without data from the CNTC, evaluating
the global environmental impacts of TC manufacturing
only accounts for roughly half the global total.
As a government-owned company, the CNTC does not
have the same transnational shareholder demands for
reporting environmental accounting, as limited as these are.
Table 5 Reported waste disposal related to tobacco manufacturing: Landfill
Company Millions of Pounds Tons per million cigs/per $/£ million revenue
Altria (FY 2014) (Altria 2015) 22.7 Not reported
BAT (2016) (British American Tobacco 2018) 287 0.12 metric tons
Imperial (2015/16) 109.6 (Imperial Brands PLC 2017) 1.4 per £million (Imperial Tobacco Group 2015)
JTI (2016) 25 (Japan Tobacco Incorporated
2017)
0.17 per million cigs (Japan Tobacco Incorporated
2013)
PMI (2015) 280 Not reported
RAI (2015) (Reynolds American International
2018)
56.6 2.4 per million dollars
Global total 1917
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What is known, is that CNTC disposes an estimated
175 000–600 000 cubic meters of wastewater per year,
which contains fine suspended particles as well as aromatic
compounds and nicotine (China Bike 2015). One source in
the Chinese edition of Fortune magazine reports that for
CNTC the “…total industrial emissions of sulfur dioxide
[amount to] 5688 tons, down 29.8%; chemical oxygen
demand emissions are 2751 tons, down 11.7%” (Xinhya
News 2012). No baseline is given in the article. However,
one CNTC subgroup, Jia Yao Holdings Limited, reported
to have incurred environmental costs of approximately
RMB451,000 ($70 000 US) for 2014 and RMB589000
($90 000 US) for 2013, according to their annual report
(Jia Yao Holdings Limited 2015). We were unable to
determine whether these are government fines for polluting
or other costs, and what share of market Jia Yao com-
mands. Jia Yao purports to comply with China’s Law on
the Prevention and Treatment of Solid Waste Pollution and
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of
Clean Production. Such environmental claims, however,
are undermined by statements such as “[t]he Directors are
also of the view that our production process does not
generate hazards that will cause any significant adverse
impact on the environment” (Jia Yao Holdings Limited
2015); other transnational tobacco companies are very
aware indeed of their environmental impact: hence their
strenuous reported efforts to reduce their impact. Such
appraisals of environmental impact are at odds with what is
known about the environmental impacts of tobacco man-
ufacturing as reported by other tobacco producers. While
China grows most of the tobacco CNTC uses, it has started
expanding into other areas, such as its recent use of Zim-
babwe tobacco, where it recently also set up manufacturing
facilities (Samukange 2015).
Electronic cigarettes: A looming environmental
threat
The rise of electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) in industri-
alized countries is changing the composition of the envi-
ronmental harms of tobacco (Ligaya 2013; Chang 2014;
World Health Organization 2017a; Hendlin 2018; PMI
2018). Because these products are composed of low-value
but sophisticated electronics, the environmental costs from
manufacturing e-cigarettes may be much more severe than
cigarettes per unit (Hendlin 2018).
E-cigarettes made in different countries are manufac-
tured according to the standards of the manufacturer’s
country, and do not always conform to laws for exposures
to metals and other toxins in the countries they are used. In
the United States, e-cigarettes originally were to be inclu-
ded as drug-delivery devices under the US Food and Drug
Administration, which would have required much stricter
product regulation. However, a 2010 suit overturned this
designation (Committee on the Review of the Health
Effects of Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems et al.
2018). The 2016 FDA Deeming Rule aimed to place
e-cigarettes under a 2007 regulatory cut-off which would
require extensive testing of e-cigarettes if they wished to
remain on the market. As the deadline for this requirement
has been postponed from 2018 to 2022, e-cigarette manu-
factures are free to produce and sell devices with minimal
oversight by health or environmental regulatory institutions
(Eilperin 2017). In the UK, while e-cigarettes disposal and
reclamation must adhere to the Waste Electrical and
Electronic Equipment Regulations, requiring companies to
receive and process electronic waste (BAT 2018), the
arduous process of sending these products back to manu-
factures and having to pack and pay for postage to
responsibly return these products likely limits the effec-
tiveness of such consumer-side responsibility to unknown
efficacy.
The chemical content of e-liquids and the construction
of e-cigarettes vary widely—from disposable single-use
“cig-a-like” products resembling cigarettes, to refillable
“vape pens,” to “mods” and “tanks.” The best-selling
device in the US as of 2018 is the Juul cartridge-based or
“pod” e-cigarette (Craver 2018). While the USB stick-
shaped device is not single-use, its hard plastic e-juice
cartridges are. Because of the overwhelming diversity of
products, no blanket assertion on the environmental impact
of these products is possible. Introducing new classes of
plastics, metals, cartridges, lithium-ion batteries, and con-
centrated nicotine solutions, however, involves signifi-
cantly more environmentally intensive manufacturing
processes than products that are primarily made of plant
material and plastic filters, as combustible cigarettes are
(Goniewicz et al. 2013; Lerner et al. 2015).
Ibis World, an industry market research company, pre-
dicts that “the [traditional] Cigarette and Tobacco Product
Manufacturing industry is in the declining stage of its life
cycle” (IBIS World 2017). They note, however, that the
industry will resist this decline through expansion into
electronic cigarettes and other electronic nicotine delivery
devices.
The tobacco industry is aware of the new scope of
environmental harms e-cigarettes pose. PMI discussed the
“need to manage new areas of impact due to the increasing
use of electronics and batteries in our products” (Philip
Morris International 2016). As tobacco companies
increasingly are selling electronic smoking devices, they
acknowledge that “while we embed new processes, the
efficiency of our energy and water use may worsen until
both knowledge and economies of scale improve” (Philip
Morris International 2016). PMI’s Lifecycle Analysis
(LCA) performed for e-cigarettes and other so-called
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reduced-risk products (RRPs) “highlighted the impact that
RRPs will have in [their ecological] footprint and plans in
product development, manufacturing, distribution and rest
of value chain have been implemented to mitigate their
impact in our footprint” (PMI 2017b).
Fundamentally, the tobacco industry has been aware of
“cradle to grave” extended-producer responsibility manu-
facturing since at least as early as 1991 (GJW Government
Relations 1991), and has nonetheless refrained from
implementing practices that could reduce the waste from
their products, both in terms of production and disposal.
Conventional cigarette filters, for instance, have been
proven to do more harm than good in terms of health (Song
et al. 2017), and these unnecessary appendages to cigar-
ettes, originally developed in the 1950’s to assuage grow-
ing fears over the health harms of cigarettes, directly harm
the environment in their material production and disposal
(Pollay and Dewhirst 2002; Smith and McDaniel 2011;
Song et al. 2017). Based on reviewing industry documents,
it does not appear as if any cradle-to-grave industrial
ecology has been undertaken to minimize the amount of
ecological impact of e-cigarette manufacture and disposal.
DISCUSSION
Lack of standard reporting measures
and independent third-party oversight
The impacts of tobacco manufacturing on ecosystems,
humans, and animals are difficult to quantify. Under the
guise of proprietary information, often rationalized to
prevent counterfeit manufacturing, tobacco industry man-
ufacturing processes are closely guarded secrets (Imperial
Tobacco 2006); this proprietary protection further inhibits
research into environmental impacts of the manufacturing
process. Another concern with self-reported data is that not
all manufacturing plants are considered in these reports.
For example, for unknown reasons Imperial Tobacco omits
data from their manufacturing facilities in Laos and Turkey
(Imperial Tobacco Group 2015). Without including envi-
ronmental costs into the actual sales price of tobacco
products, governments inadvertently subsidize tobacco use
and enable the tobacco industry to externalize the envi-
ronmental costs of their products. Countries such as Brazil
and Canada have mandated tobacco manufacturers to dis-
close information on manufacturing practices, product
ingredients, toxic constituents, and toxic emissions to
evaluate the environmental impacts of tobacco production
in these countries (World Health Organization 2008). More
stringent compliance is necessary globally, and while
accurate disclosure can assist in mitigating obvious viola-
tions, this do not always translate into decreased emissions.
Voluntary initiatives, furthermore, can be interpreted in
the literature as proactive moves by the industry to stave-
off regulation which would require them to adhere to
externally wrought environmental standards and practices
(Soneryd and Uggla 2015).
Tobacco company involvement in environmental
and social stewardship promotion organizations
While tobacco industry environmental reporting remains
fragmentary, previous industry involvement in the United
Nations Global Compact (UNGC) has revealed finer-
grained environmental impact data than their sustainability
reports or annual reports. Thus, industry involvement in
these organizations has motivated them to disclose more
data regarding their real environmental harms, giving
environmental scientists and industrial ecologists some
data for analysis. At the same time, involvement in the
UNGC and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) lent a
veneer of respectability and credibility that allows the
industry to be seen more as “partners” in public health and
environmental sustainability than their deserved reputation
as sullying both. PMI, for example, praised:
We work on the UN Global Compact and have
published our first communication on progress to the
United Nations Global Compact, reporting compre-
hensively on our sustainability practices across
human rights, labor rights, environment and anticor-
ruption.… We are also part of the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), the
WeMeanBusiness coalition, and since participating in
the UNFCCC COP21 in Paris, we have continued to
engage externally regarding our commitments on
climate change adaptation and water, including our
support for the Paris Agreement. (Philip Morris
International 2017a).
Such credentials sound impressive, and constitute CSR
virtue signaling. Therefore, including tobacco companies
into organizations such as the UNGC, the UNFCCC or
CDP may dilute the designation or brand of the conferring
organization, while giving a false sense of achievement to
the company, that it can then parade to the public. As of
October 15, 2017, however, as part of an integrity review,
the UN Global Compact no longer allows tobacco compa-
nies to be part of the initiative (van der Eijk et al. 2017),
and thus PMI and other tobacco companies can no longer
claim their mantle of support. Whether other organizations
follow suit, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project, remains
to be seen. Additionally, the cost of false credibility must
be weighed against the detail of reporting. If these business
recognition organizations extract more accurate and precise
data from the companies—which can be debated—then
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they certainly have some merit, despite their social and
political enablement. Instead of trading data for legitimacy,
governments could mandate the industry to disclose third-
party verified data, setting goals to reduce environmental
harms.
Ecological modernization and greenwashing
One important consideration is the overall sustainability of
the tobacco industry in general. A 2004 WHO report called
tobacco industry CSR an “inherent contradiction” (World
Health Organization 2004). While the issue of increasing
efficiency of manufacturing and transport processes to
decrease the ecological harms by the industry is real, it
cannot be ignored that industrial tobacco manufacturing is
a polluting process producing a hazardous product with
adverse environmental impacts and justice concerns.
Manufactures have been aware that consumer perceptions
of their manufacturing processes have been scrutinized,
and are trying to allay such concerns. For example, BAT
(Canada) created biodegradable packaging and more eco-
logical manufacturing practices as selling points for their
popular brand of cigarettes (Fig. 4); others, such as RJ
Reynolds have emphasized investments in “green trans-
port” (RAI 2017).
Although CSR reports highlight sustainability initiatives
by the TCs, actual environmental impacts of manufacturing
and transport remain a low priority for TCs (Reynolds
American International 2018), and a low priority to date for
tobacco control advocates (Framework Convention Alli-
ance and Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids 2015). How-
ever, the inclusion of the WHO FCTC in the UN
Sustainable Development Goals and the WHO FCTC
Conference of the Parties’ decision on improving the
understanding of the environmental impact of tobacco
indicates that these issues will gain higher visibility and
priority.
Some TCs advertise buying carbon offsets for portions
of their emissions, and increasingly show interest in the
money-saving aspects of reducing their energy footprint
and increasing their efficiency (PMI 2017a). At the same
time, it appears that carbon credits for factories in the EU
are taken advantage of when they are convenient to the
businesses (i.e., low cost), but are not maintained in other
markets. PMI also noted that “Regulations requiring carbon
labelling on products could impact PMI for both conven-
tional cigarettes and our Reduced-Risk Products (RRPs)
[such as e-cigarettes], which may include electronic com-
ponents” (PMI 2017b). They note that the impact of carbon
labelling on their different (conventional versus electronic)
tobacco products “could also be an opportunity for PMI,” if
they are able to differentiate themselves with low-carbon
products vis-a`-vis their competitors.
Regulation rather than voluntary CSR
Rather than exhibiting authentic corporate responsibility,
TC manufacturing activities comprise a hodge-podge of
voluntary measures aimed at staving-off regulation
(Palazzo and Richter 2005). The tobacco industry is known
for moving from countries to avoid facing the conse-
quences of their activities, including environmental harms
(Gilmore 2004; Benson 2011). In 2013, after neighborhood
leaders near the BAT Ugandan plant complained of fouled
air, and the Parliament moved to draft a law more strictly
regulating the production and sale of tobacco in the
country, BAT closed their Ugandan plant and moved these
facilities to Kenya (Wesonga and Butagira 2013). When
citizens petition for better business or environmental
practices, TCs (and other polluting industries) routinely
uproot their operations and take them where civil society
has less political influence and where fewer regulatory
controls on manufacturing exist. Such actions undermine
the plausibility that the greening of the tobacco industry
springs from altruistic or environmental concerns, rather
than public pressure, preempting government regulation,
and cost-saving measures.
At the same time that TCs sometimes evade regulation
in regions overlooked by global public health environ-
mental advocacy, TCs respond to public outcry and pres-
sure orchestrated in developed countries. In countries
where environmental sustainability is an important political
Fig. 4 Foil-free, plastic-free, sustainably-managed cardboard cigar-
ettes (2009, BAT-owned Canadian du Maurier brand) (Steeman 2009)
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agenda item, TCs prioritize ecological modernization—the
process of rationalizing production to save money while
adopting greener technologies (Hajer 1996). In countries
with less oversight, such actions are absent. Holding the
tobacco industry accountable everywhere for the environ-
mental justice externalities of the manufacturing and
transport of tobacco, measurable by a variety of environ-
mental indicators, is crucial to achieve continued reduc-
tions in TCs’ ecological footprint and a fair assessment of
the product’s true cost.
Voluntary life-cycle assessments (LCA)
versus mandatory extended producer responsibility
(EPR)
Extended producer responsibility (EPR) programs and
legislation could require the tobacco industry to pay for
take-back programs and incentives that help to keep
tobacco product waste out of the environment (Novotny
et al. 2015). Such programs would be managed by gov-
ernment agencies and other non-profit organizations, car-
ried out independently from the tobacco industry, and
could promote awareness campaigns regarding the human
and environmental toxicity of tobacco product waste.
To preempt regulation, PMI has begun investigating the
efficacy of life-cycle assessments, which might sidestep
pressure for third-party analysis and interventions (Philip
Morris International 2017b). This strategy of preempting
policy intervention through undertaking voluntary report-
ing and self-censure has been used previously by the
industry (McDaniel and Malone 2009; McDaniel et al.
2016, 2018). PMI’s performance of LCAs may indicate
their awareness that LCAs are used for EPR, and could be
used to preempt EPR regulation. EPR for the environ-
mental costs of tobacco has been proposed by the European
Union Commission as a potential solution to the tobacco
epidemic:
One very straightforward solution which the con-
sulting group suggested was to calculate the extra
cost of smoking—hospital admissions, days lost to
work, litter clean up and so on—and then to charge
this to the tobacco companies on a pro rata basis
according to market share. Once a year, Philip Morris
et al. would get a bill for their share of billions of
Euros that these externalities comprise. (Hastings
2012, p. 179)
There is no reason why such an EPR framework could not
be applied to the harms to the environment. Especially for
“luxury emissions” (Shue 1993), as tobacco products
uncontroversially are, these emissions should be taxed
according to their total harms.
LIMITATIONS
The data in this reviewwere limited to partial reporting by the
tobacco companies. The opacity of self-report data regarding
the actual environmental input and output of tobacco manu-
facturing serves as a major barrier to objectively evaluating
the true environmental costs of tobacco production. Missing
data, inconsistency of reporting across companies, uneven
reporting on production intensity, and problems of trans-
parency and reliability remain. The contrasting metrics dif-
ferent companies and even the same company in different
years use in self-reporting (i.e., liters versus gallons), hinder
comparative evaluation of resource use and effluence between
companies. Also challenging, is that definitions of manufac-
turing intensity are not standardized. Some companies report
efficiency or intensity per million cigarettes produced, while
others adopt measures per million dollars/pounds in revenue,
providing no common unit for analysis, complicating com-
parisons across companies.
Because the environmental impacts of tobacco manu-
facturing are not independently regulated and monitored,
little has been reported outside of the industry’s own
analyses. Without a stable, historical, or uniform baseline,
global projections can only be extrapolated from existing
industry data. Additionally, company-wide self-reported
data from China’s National Tobacco Company (CNTC), if
publicly available, were not locatable by us, even by native
language research assistants. At best, we can assume that a
company as large as CNTC is no less polluting, inferring
from other Chinese manufacturing processes (Pratt 2011;
Liu et al. 2016). The result is that the estimates made here
through extrapolation likely severely underestimate the real
environmental costs of global tobacco manufacturing.
The focus of this analysis was mainly cigarette manu-
facturing. While cigarettes still comprise almost 90% of all
tobacco sales globally (except for South Asia), other
tobacco products, especially e-cigarettes, also weigh
heavily on the environment (Eriksen et al. 2015).
CONCLUSION
The actual environmental impact of tobacco manufacturing
remains unknown. Publically available data are selectively
self-reported by the tobacco industry, and measured
through accounting and consulting firms that have a direct
interest in maintaining positive relationships with the
tobacco companies funding them. As such, reporting may
be opportunistic both in the scope of data reported and
presentation, highlighting sustainability success while
omitting data on environmental damages or increased
emissions due to manufacturing that do not hew to the
desired progressive narrative arc of reducing ecological
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externalities. This piecemeal reporting—rife in CSR
reports across industries (Gray 2010; Perego and Kolk
2012), but especially trenchant for an industry with decades
of documented manipulation of public opinion and science
(Michaels 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2011; Proctor 2012)
—raises serious doubts regarding the tobacco companies’
commitments to reducing the environmental consequences
of tobacco manufacturing.
As the 2017 WHO report on the environmental impact of
tobacco concludes, “the adage ‘there is no such thing as a safe
cigarette’ could be extended to assert that there is no such
thing as an environmentally neutral tobacco industry” (World
Health Organization 2017a). Especially, if these companies
adhered to Trucost accounting which incorporates environ-
mental externalities (water use, air pollution, land degrada-
tion, etc.) (Trucost and TEEB for Business Coalition 2013),
tobacco would not be a profitable industry. Yet, until the
tobacco industry is required to internalize its social and
environmental harms, citizens, governments, future genera-
tions, and the earth are subsidizing the profits these companies
reap. While for some products this trade-off may be judged
acceptable in exchange for the goods an industry provides to
society, tobacco provides no such social good, and deserves a
utility calculus accounting for all of its ranging harms,
including environmental ones. Parties’ implementing the
WHO FCTC should consider the environmental impact of
tobacco product manufacturing and transport within the
context of implementing Article 18 and expand the current
focus on tobacco growing to a more comprehensive envi-
ronmental approach. Countries striving to reach the SDGs by
2030 must incorporate the environmental harms of tobacco as
part of their strategies to reach these goals, adopting regula-
tions mandating extended producer responsibility.
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